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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The continuous struggle of different ethnic groups around the world suggests that they 
experience deeper social and economic grievances as guiding framework to have more 
equal society by all necessary means. The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East 
in 2011 show that to sustain a political regime there should be a minimum level of 
fairness and social justice experienced by the different groups of the society (Cederman, 
Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013, p. 1), at the objective level, which corresponds to groups’ 
real conditions and subjective level, which corresponds to the perceived status by the 
different groups. The main drivers to these uprisings were of primary inspiration to this 
research along with the different implications of the various economic, social and 
structural arrangements. 
Over the past decades, the studies of applied social sciences have been closely linked to 
behavioral studies across various fields. For instance, economists and political scientists 
have been recognizing that to study the implications of the different economic, social and 
structural adjustments, it is necessary to pay attention to the mechanisms of decision-
making processes and communication strategies that guide the different interacting units 
of societies.  Similarly, policy analysts are being more concerned with studying how the 
different regulations result in altering the behavior of individuals by incentivizing and/or 
demotivating certain actions.  The human agency has thus been able to place itself as a 
core focal point for analysis in most fields of study.  
Yet at the same time, the ongoing debate between individual’s agency and how it reflects 
human capacity, free will and rational choice on one hand, and social structure on the 
other hand, and how it reflects the limitations and constraints that guide human behavior 
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and practice, has never come to an end. Similarly, the existing dichotomy between 
autonomy and how it is reflected in individualism, against collective action, continue to 
emerge in almost all social sciences critiques and analyses, especially those examining 
different notions of fairness, wellbeing and political stability.  
This tension between individual and collective rationality mostly prevails when scholars 
attempt to examine major collective actions ranging from activities of voluntary and 
participatory democratization, passing by violent mob actions, reaching both intra and 
inter state wars and armed conflicts. Throughout their continuous inquiry, over the past 
decades, scholars and policy analysts have also come up with different models and 
theories to explain collective action behavior and mobilization of the different groups. 
Among these theories are the structural theory of ethnic mobilization, the rational choice 
theory and the social identity model of collective action.  
The structural theory assumes that when the members of ethnic groups occupy different 
and disadvantaged positions in any structural category, such as class and labor market, 
and when they become aware of their disadvantageous situation, collective action and 
mobilization will evidently follow (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982).  
However, the main critique addressed to this category of theories is that it does not 
account for the non-occurrence of collective action and ethnic mobilization in many 
instances where ethnic structural and differential stratification exists. It thus only helps to 
explain the desirability of collective action and not its actual occurrence.  It also ignores a 
very important feature of all collective actions and that is at the end, any action that 
happens for the pursuit of collective goals, is done by individuals (Hechter, Friedman, & 
Appelbaum, 1982). 
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In an attempt to solve for the shortcomings of the structural theory, the rational choice is 
proposed. This theory advocates that individuals have different goals and utilities. And 
since individuals cannot pursue all their goals due to the scarcity of resources, they have 
to make rational choices between alternatives to maximize their utilities and welfare, 
which are limited by a set of structural constraints. The major premise of this theory is 
that individuals will only participate in collective actions when the benefits attributed to it 
outweigh the costs of participation (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982) 
A critical dimension to the rational choice theory is the presence of ethnic organizations 
that governs the distribution of costs and benefits across the different individuals through 
private rewards and punishments in an attempt to solve for free riding. The free-rider 
dilemma acts as a main obstacle for collective actions as it could demotivate rational 
individuals to participate in collective action and mobilization, knowing that they could 
benefit from the end results of the collective production of public goods and goals 
without paying the adequate costs (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982) 
In an attempt to go further beyond the analysis of individual cost-benefit analysis, and to 
examine the factors that influence the valuation of these costs and outcomes that governs 
the individual’s calculations, Zomeren et al. (2008)proposes the integrative social identity 
model of collective action to incorporate in the analysis the socio-psychological 
determinants of collective action. In this model, the three subjective variables that affect 
collective actions are perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and the strong sense of 
social identity. Perceived injustice shifts the attention from studying the consequences of 
objective inequality to studying the consequences of its subjective experience because it 
is believed that the latter carries greater weight than the material origins of the former and 
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a perceived sense of deprivation could be a strong motivator for collective action (van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This variable could thus be seen as an added and 
enriching dimension to the structural theory.  
As for perceived efficacy, it pertains to the subjective expectancy that a certain collective 
action will be successful and effective in bringing about the desired goals (van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Again, this shift from objective cost-benefit analysis to 
subjective perceptions of efficacy is an added value to the rational choice theory. 
As for the social identity element, its integration proposes that people generally seek to 
pursue a positive social identity associated with their membership groups; it thus serves 
to mobilize people for social change. A strong sense of social identity helps to shift the 
focus onto strong group-based emotions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). 
Along the same line of thought with the social identity model of collective action, was the 
evolution of concepts such as social capital and how it matters to new economic and 
political development theories.  Individuals invest in building social networks to grant 
them power and solidarity and to strengthen their collective identity in order to increase 
their capacity for collective action. In other words, social capital could be thought as a 
transformative channel that lies on the grounds of normative commitments that serves to 
transform individuals from self-seeking agents with little sense of obligation to others 
into community members with shared interests, a common identity, and a commitment to 
the common good (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The cultural affinities of the groups are 
therefore an important pillar for the formation of social capital. It is therefore important 
to pay attention to the norms and believes that serve to gather a community and form the 
boundaries of groups. In fact, it is often argued that the diffusion and authority of norms 
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and believes shape the choices of individuals in the smaller aggregate groups and 
communities in their continuous efforts to renegotiate their places within the larger 
aggregate, i.e. society (Adler & Kwon, 2002).As mentioned earlier by Stewart, these 
cultural identities have an important influence on the behavior of both individuals and 
groups. They affect how others treat individuals within groups and also affect their 
overall wellbeing (Stewart, 2002). 
For the purpose of this research, group identification is based on economic, education, 
and occupation opportunities that coincide with cultural differences and ethnicity. Often, 
the argument prevails that ethnic identities that are based on race, language, religion, 
tribal affiliation or even regional differences could serve as effective binder for the 
purposes of group formation. In fact, ethnicity is considered as a superior basis for group 
formation as compared to social class for instance (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). In 
addition, we believe that the wealth ownership and types of occupations along with 
access to education can identify the ethnic inequality as consequence of marginalization.  
The main hypothesis driving this research is that one of the most important factors that 
differentiate between the different ethnic groups’ wellbeing and motivate their different 
behaviors is the presence of deep inequalities between them, in terms of access to 
political, economic and social resources. As implied by the concept of social capital and 
the integrative social identity model, since the individuals positions, merits and self-
esteem are bound with the progress of the groups to which they belong by social and 
cultural networks as well as identities, the presence of such inequalities reduce the 
individuals’ welfare within the deprived groups. The members of a deprived and 
discriminated group are thus expected to have a networking disadvantage accompanied 
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with economic and social implications. This results from the notion that the individual 
welfare does not only depend on the individual’s own circumstances, but it is also linked 
to the prestige and attributed merit of the group to which she/he identifies (Stewart, 2002) 
In such cases, the perception of such inequalities can have an important effect on the 
groups’ behaviors with respect to their mobilization and collective actions, which could 
in turn lead to a wide range of political instabilities. These political disturbances could 
take the form of riots organized by the deprived groups or they could take a more extreme 
form of mobilizations such as civil wars between the different competing groups. In fact, 
in many cases, it is not only the resentment of the deprived groups that could result in 
political instabilities, but the relatively privileged could also mobilize. In these cases, the 
privileged is motivated by fear that the deprived would demand and seek access for more 
resources, economical and political (Stewart, 2002). 
The main aim of this study is to focus on the extent of impact of economic, social 
inequalities on political inequalities among culturally and economically defined ethnic 
groups, since a better understanding of such relationship provides an opportunity to 
discuss the different aspects of history and/or political choices that have resulted into the 
creation of such differences within the multi-ethnic societies. It further facilitates a better 
understanding of the concept of inter-group inequalities developed as a driving motive for 
the collective choices and behaviors of the different ethnic groups. This interrelation is 
better explained by Cramer’s (2003)argument stating that economic inequalities exist by 
virtue   of social and political forces that give rise to it, just as materials forces shape the 
social and political. In other words, economic inequalities are embedded and structured 
by the historical and social milieu (Muhula, 2009). 
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Research Question  The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of economic, education and 
employment opportunities on political inequalities among culturally defined ethnic 
groups. More specifically, the study attempts to examine the effect of particular ethnic 
group’s access to durable economic assets, education, and employment, on the 
probability of its political inclusion.  
For the purpose of this research, political inclusion refers only to the degree of access to 
central state power by the different political ethnic groups and those who claim to 
represent them. This research, following the available data sources that will be elaborated 
in Chapter 3, limits state power to the access to executive power only, disregarding 
access to legislative and judicial institutions. Examples of executive power institutions 
that are examined to categorize the political inclusion include: “the presidency, the 
cabinet, and senior posts in the administration in democratic regimes; the army command 
in military dictatorships; or the ruling party leadership in one-party states” (Vogt, 2014). 
The existing interrelations between horizontal inequalities in multiethnic societies are 
studied, as an attempt to examine the multidimensionality of the horizontal inequalities.  
Significance  The significance of this research is twofold, theoretical and practical. From the theoretical 
part, since the concept of the horizontal inequalities among groups is relatively new, this 
research strengthen the notions of existing and persistent inter-group inequalities by 
focusing on the different dimensions of inequalities, particularly political and socio-
economic, among different ethnic groups.  
8  
In fact, most of the literature attempts to separately examine the consequences of the 
different dimension of horizontal inequalities, by focusing on the link between political 
or socio-economic inequalities and conflict onset and civil wars duration. However, this 
research takes a step back and attempts to examine the dynamics of wealth, employment 
and education opportunities on inequalities. This study contributes to the quantitative 
literature on horizontal inequalities and social exclusion. It attempts to carefully examine 
the interrelations and correlations existing between the different dimensions of horizontal 
inequalities leading to social exclusion. It adopts the multidimensional approach 
advocated for the analysis of both concepts, as will be shown in Chapter 2, by attempting 
to examine the effect of social and economic opportunities, in the form of access to 
durable assets, education and occupation on political opportunities, in the form of 
political inclusion and access to executive power. As will be shown later in Chapter 3, the 
study relies on aggregating data from DHS surveys in a way that helps in assessing the 
differential status of the different ethnic groups in developing countries. It also combines 
the comprehensive EPR dataset with the DHS survey.  
As for the practical part, by studying such interrelations among inequalities, this research 
will serve to identify a measure of corrective policies and regulations intended to resolve 
such structural inequalities and discrepancies at the group level.  
The study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses theoretical literature review that 
highlights the main guiding theories of the research and analysis. Chapter 3 presents the 
research design, with the study’s argument and hypothesis, the sample, data sources and 
operationalization of the different variables used in the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical analysis of the different models used to test the study’s hypothesis. Finally, 
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Chapter 5 concludes with some closing remarks and briefly discusses the added value of 
this study and the implications for future research along with some brief policy 
recommendations.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Multiethnic Societies 
The importance of cultural ethnicity has been highlighted over the past decades in many 
instances in social sciences. As it is observed, instead of abandoning traditional ethnic 
identities for the search for socio-economic and political equity, ethnic groups have 
retained their identities along the way and irrespective of their political economic status. 
Increasingly, political and economic strife is defined along ethno-religious lines. (Scott, 
1990). After years of social mobility and migration, people of different cultures have 
become closer to each other in terms of physical proximity. These culture differences 
have been accounting for most of the current conflicts and societal disorders that are 
taking place (Stewart, 2002).  
In the literature, there are basically two types of multiethnic societies that differ in terms 
of inter-ethnic group relations. According to Horowitz, ethnic groups are ranked into two 
types (Horowitz, 1985). In the first type of multiethnic societies, ethnicity is represented 
in historically hierarchical power structures where one group dominates others. In the 
second type, “ethnicity constitutes the politically relevant cleavage between different 
groups that meet each other on a relatively equal footing” (Vogt, 2013). While ethnicity 
is employed to practice constant oppression and stabilize the state of inequality in the first 
type of societies, in the latter type it creates a competitive sense of ethno-nationalism 
accompanied by an alternating dominance over the society, resulting in fluctuating 
inclusion and exclusion arrangements (Vogt, 2013). 
Horowitz’ (1985) conceptualization is based on the coincidence and non-coincidence of 
social class with ethnic origins. In ranked systems, the state of being divided into social 
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classes  is identical to group membership, and group affiliations determine the possibility 
of social class mobility. (Horowitz, 1985, p. 22). On the other hand, unranked systems are 
marked by the coexistence of different parallel ethnic groups, which are internally 
divided (Horowitz, 1985, p. 23). 
Ethnicity 
We now move to the different conceptualizations of ethnicity and ethnic identity in the 
literature. Three main views guide the exact conceptualization of ethnicity: the 
primordialist view, the instrumentalist view and the constructionist view. For the 
primordialist, ethnicity is a cultural given. According to Anthony D. Smith (1984), socio-
biological factors define ethnicity, making it a “quasi-natural matter of descent.” 
According to Horowitz, an inclusive conception of ethnicity embraces differences 
identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin 
(Horowitz, 1985, p. 41). It is based on collective ancestry, which usually carries with it 
traits believed to be innate (Horowitz, 1985, p. 52). It cannot be discarded by social 
mobility, as in the case of social classes for instance (Bacal, 1991). It thus follows that 
ethnicity is both ascribed and static (Yang, 2000, p. 42). In this view ethnic affiliations 
are highly emotionally charged and, on some accounts, irrational (Østby, 2003). 
According to Persons (1999), there is a socio-psychological aspect to the primordial 
perspective, which sustains group solidarity, and which provides answers to essentialist 
questions pertaining to identity. Thereby, ethnicity sets the boundaries differentiating 
between one’s group and the others (Persons, 1999, p. 7). One main critique of the 
primordialist view is that it does not account for the change of ethnic groups over time. 
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Similarly, this view does not explain why the boundaries of the ethnic groups change 
(Stewart, 2002; Scott, 1990). 
As for the instrumentalist view, it views ethnicity as an instrument or tool for gaining 
resources (Yang, 2000, p. 46). In this view, ethnic motivation and behavior are 
structurally determined and correspond to objective and adaptive socio-economic 
interests (Bacal, 1991). Group leaders and elites thus advocate ethnicity in order to 
achieve certain interests (Stewart, 2002) and it is greatly affected by the rights, 
opportunities and the distribution of power resources as determined deferentially by the 
rules of the game in a given social setting (Persons, 1999, p. 7). In other words, ethnic 
groups are also interest groups. The instrumentalist approach is inspired from the rational 
choice theory, which advocates that people act to promote their socioeconomic positions. 
In this view, ethnicity is nothing more than an option (Yang, 2000, p. 47). However, it 
has to be noted that it has often been argued that these different perspectives and 
approaches to conceptualize ethnicity are not mutually exclusive. In concrete behavioral 
contexts, we can expect to find cultural, social and strategic elements at play (Douglass, 
1988; Scott, 1990) 
As for the constructionist view, it is considered a midway approach between both 
instrumentalist and primordial approaches. It holds that ethnicity is socially constructed, 
without implying prerequisites of deep cultural ties (Persons, 1999, p. 7). Thereof, it is 
the result of historical and political processes. Constructionists argue that ethnicity is 
neither immutable nor completely open; it is not an individual attribute but a social 
phenomenon. In other words, a person’s culture is partly inherited, but also constructed 
and chosen, with many people having multiple identities (Østby, 2003). Much of the 
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work of the constructionist view has been developed to respond to the primordialist 
critique mentioned above, by showing that some of the social categories, which have 
been taken for granted, have indeed changed over time (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). From 
that perspective, ethnic solidarity results from certain social circumstances, or rather 
changing or differential circumstances, both internal and external, under which the group 
exists. In that sense, ethnicity is dynamic (Yang, 2000, p. 44) and ethnic boundaries may 
be defended, penetrated, or ignored depending upon situational exigencies (Douglass, 
1988). Yet the primordialists argue that while constructionists would be able to account 
for the change of ethnic identity over time, they would not be able to account for its 
persistence, which could last for centuries. In other words, “changing circumstances 
could explain the fluctuations, but only primordial sentiments can account for its 
persistence” (Scott, 1990).  
Group membership, social capital and intergroup relations 
It thus follows that an inherent and fundamental part of human life is group membership. 
It is in fact a part of what defines individual identities. As stated by Gellner (1964), 
human beings have an instinctive need for a sense of belonging, identification, and 
exclusion. From this notion of belonging and exclusion come boundaries of the different 
ethnic groups, which have an important influence on the behavior of both individuals and 
groups (Stewart, 2002). Often the argument prevails that the various ethnic markers, like 
race, language, religion, form a strong ground for group identification. In fact, ethnicity is 
considered a superior basis for group formation compared to social class for instance 
(Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). The importance of group affiliation has been highlighted 
in many theories, most importantly theories of social capital and intergroup relations.  
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Social capital results from a strong sense of community, which brings together people 
over common interests. As elaborately mentioned by Adler and Kwon (2002), “social 
capital . . . has informed the study of families, youth behavior problems, schooling and 
education, public health, community life, democracy and governance, economic 
development and general problems of collective action”. In order to achieve this status of 
collective action, individuals invest in building social networks to grant them power and 
solidarity and to strengthen their collective identity in order to increase their capacity for 
future actions. Social capital tends to conceptualize the networking strategies that explain 
trust, cultural, social support, social resources and embeddedness. The cultural affinities 
of the groups are therefore an important pillar for the formation of social capital. It is thus 
important to pay attention to the norms and believes that serve to gather a community and 
form the boundaries of groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Group affiliation and categorization is also important for theories of intergroup behavior, 
especially theories of intergroup conflict. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), a group 
is conceptualized as a group of individuals who assign themselves to a certain social 
category and are emotionally attached to this collective definition. As a result, they also 
share common perceptions, to varying extents, of their group status. It is the social 
categorization that acts as a cognitive tool to segment, classify and order the surrounding 
environment, which enables the individuals to undertake many forms of social actions. 
The argument that social categorization provides the roots for intergroup behavioral 
analysis assumes the following: first, individuals aim at enhancing their self-esteem; 
second, social groups and group affiliation can have either positive or negative 
associations; third, the way members evaluate their own groups is usually affected by 
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comparison against other groups in terms of social status. It thus follows, from that 
perspective, that when social identity is negatively perceived and unsatisfactory, 
individuals will attempt to either leave the group with which they are identified and join a 
more positively perceived group, or make their existing group stand out (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). From that notion of intergroup comparisons, we can start to introduce the concept 
of horizontal inequalities.  
Horizontal Inequalities 
It is true that some countries managed to avoid the cultural cleavage caused by the 
different ethnic compositions. However, the post-colonial states in developing parts of 
the world were remarkably vulnerable when it came to dealing with cultural divisions. 
(Horowitz, 1985, p. 6). Both diffused and announced importance of ethnic affiliations and 
tendencies in multiethnic societies find their way in many evident aspects including 
developmental plans, educational controversies, land policy and so on. The importance of 
ethnicity is also reflected in the organizational structures of many multiethnic societies 
where ethnic affiliation guides the structure of economic and political organizations. In 
addition, capital and labor are often organized along ethnic lines. Political life in societies 
that are deeply influenced by ethnic division inevitably suffers ethnic repercussions. In 
such societies, governments tend to adopt discriminating policies that work in favor of 
some groups over others. Gradually, the adopted polices shape a differential economic 
system that operates strictly under these terms. Ethnic cleavage in divided societies has 
become a principal line of political division to the extent that it creates and fosters other 
cleavages (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 12-13). 
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As defined by Stewart (2002), horizontal inequalities are severe inequalities between 
culturally defined groups. Stewart adopts the term horizontal inequalities to set it apart 
from the conventional definitions of inequality, which maintain a vertical arrangement for 
individuals or households, and measures inequality across groups. Horizontal inequalities 
generally have their origins in historic circumstances, where colonial policy privileged 
some groups over others. Initial advantages led to long-term cumulative advantages, as 
resources and education allow the more privileged groups to secure further advantages 
(Stewart, 2003). Gurr (2000), however, proposes that group discrimination may be the 
result of either public policy practices or social practices. In the latter case, social 
prejudices and barriers in multi-ethnic societies could have a net effect that restricts some 
groups’ access to education, public services and good jobs, and limit their participation in 
the political life (Gurr, 2000, p. 107). Indeed, and as clarified by Sen (1992), ethnic 
affinity can be a factor with far-reaching influence on many aspects of day-to-day 
living—varying from securing employment and receiving medical attention to being 
fairly treated by the police (Sen, 1992, p. 122). For instance, In South Africa under 
apartheid nonwhites were excluded from most skilled and professional occupations 
(Østby, 2003). 
For Stewart, horizontal inequalities are multidimensional. She specified three categories 
of differentiation, in terms of inclusion and exclusion: First, the political participation in 
terms of access to government ministries, parliament and different levels of civil service 
and local government as well. Second, the economic aspects, in terms of access to the 
different assets, such as land, human capital, communal resources, privately owned 
capital and credit, government infrastructure and so on, in addition to differentiation in 
17 
terms of employment and income opportunities. Third, she classifies the aspects of social 
inclusion and exclusion, in terms of access to education, health services and housing and 
so on (Stewart, 2002). 
Furthermore, Stewart and Langer (2007)argue that horizontal inequalities among groups 
tend to persist over long periods of time, especially where group markers and boundaries 
are rigid and tend to continue existing with time, as in the case of ethnicity. In addition, 
this persistence is explained by the notion of multidimensionality and interactions among 
the different categories of horizontal inequalities and the different elements within each 
of the categories. For instance, the outcome of income and economic inequalities cause 
political and social inequalities (Stewart & Langer, 2007). 
Horizontal inequalities are similar in meaning and essence to what Tilly (1999) called 
“categorical durable inequalities”, which are inequalities that exist between distinctly 
joint categories such as female/male, citizen/foreigner. But it also extends to more 
complex classifications based on religion affiliation, ethnic origin or race (Tilly, 1999, p. 
6). He highlighted two mechanisms for the durability of such inequalities. The first is 
exploitation by powerful people, who use their leverage to gain access to resources that 
generate great profits. This is typically done through capitalizing on the effort exerted by 
the very ones who are excluded by those in power. The second mechanism is opportunity 
hoarding, where access to a key resource is exclusively monopolized by one of the 
aforementioned categories to reinforce the operations of the group. (Tilly, 1999, p. 10) 
Horizontal inequalities are also similar to what Gurr and Scarritt (1989)referred to as 
systematic differential treatment of group members by the larger society. They are also 
similar to socially embedded inequalities as referred to by Mogues and Carter (2005), 
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meaning that the wealthy and poor are distinguished not only by their assets, but also by 
their culture, language or appearance (Mogues & Carter, 2005) 
There are two categories of reasons for which the study of horizontal inequalities 
between groups is important, both instrumentally, as means of achieving other objectives, 
and in themselves for the well-being of individuals and groups respectively—especially 
when the determinants of group affiliations are tight and less fluid, as is the case with 
ethnicity. The  later direct welfare reasons are easily conceptualized as what happens to 
the group to which an individual belongs may have a direct effect on the individual’s 
welfare. That is because individual welfare depends not only on a person’s own 
circumstances, but also the prestige and wellbeing of the group with which they identify 
(Stewart, 2002). This reasoning is similar to the assumptions arranged by Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) in attempting to conceptualize social categorization and group 
comparisons, as shown earlier. In fact, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have included a 
person’s identity in the individual’s utility function arguing that a person assigned a 
category with a higher social status may enjoy an enhanced self-image. One may consider 
that a person’s sense of self is associated with different social categories and how people 
in these categories should behave. In addition, in a world of social difference, one of the 
most important economic decisions that an individual makes may be the type of person to 
be. It thus follows that limits on this choice would also be critical determinants of 
economic behavior, opportunity, and wellbeing (Akerflof & Kranton, 2000). This 
conclusion goes in line with Hoff and Pandey’s (2006) when they concluded that a 
discriminatory regime affects not only the structure of opportunities open to the different 
social groups, but also the status and social meanings assigned to those groups; in other 
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words, their social identities (Hoff & Pandey, 2006). In accordance with this line of 
thought, Loury (2000) identifies different reasons to care explicitly about group 
inequalities. One of them is that race and ethnicity influence the social networks open to 
individuals, and these networks have a major effect on individuals’ opportunities. In other 
words, factors like race, ethnicity and religious affiliations affect the individual’s choice 
of association with the different networks of affiliation. In addition, the different 
processes through which individuals develop their productive capabilities are often 
shaped by custom, convention and social norms. They are not exclusively subject to 
market forces or reflective of the individual’s capabilities. This highlights the importance 
of the role played by the social networks in mediating the effects of such market 
imperfections and negative externalities, as they help determine how resources important 
to the development of people’s productive capacities are made available to individuals 
(Loury, 2000). 
There are several instrumental reasons that lie behind the relevance of horizontal 
inequalities between groups, including the efficiency reason. Any system in which a 
group is discriminated against is likely to lead to less efficient outcomes than non-
discriminating systems, in terms of both equity and market allocations. That is because 
severe mean that some people do not have access to education or jobs on the basis of 
their potential merit or efficiency because of the group they belong to (Stewart & Langer, 
2007). Furthermore, there is the reason of social stability, the link between horizontal 
inequalities and the potential of violent conflict (Stewart, 2002).  
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Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict 
Armed conflicts disrupt infrastructure, markets and human resources (Ali & Lin, 2010). 
Over the past decades, two theories have emerged attempting to explain conflict onset: 
Greed and Grievance. Grievances theories perceive conflicts as motivated by justice-
seeking collective behaviors (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007) 
From a psychological perspective, Ted Gurr (1970) has developed the theory of relative 
deprivation, which perceives the different types of collective violence as reactions to 
frustrations developed as result of a wide gap between aspirations and actual economic 
status and material well being (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). As defined by 
Ted Gurr (1970), relative deprivation is how individuals view the difference between 
“their value expectations and their value capabilities.” Value expectations include 
possessions and social statuses that people assume they justly qualify for. On the other 
hand, value capabilities are the possessions and social statuses that people believe they 
can actually acquire and maintain. Gurr (1970) proposes that the potential of collective 
violence is a function of scope and intensity of shared discontents among members of a 
society. By the extent of relative deprivation, Gurr (1970) means how much it prevails 
over group member in terms of the perceived evaluation of expectations and capabilities. 
For instance, individual and unexpected personal deprivation would affect fewer people 
than would the suppression of a political party or the decline of a group’s status with 
reference to others. As for intensity, Gurr (1970) refers to how the perception of 
deprivation would negatively affect the members of the group, and the type of negative 
emotions associated with it, like frustration, anger, or grievance etc. While developing 
this theory, Gurr (1970) pointed out that relative deprivation cannot only be a matter of 
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economic grievances, but can also derive from sudden exclusion or deprivation of 
political standing or status. Thus elites who lose or fail to attain expected status or power 
can also experience “relative deprivation” and harbor revolutionary discontents 
(Goldstone, Gurr, Marshall, & Ulfelder, 2004). 
In an attempt to overcome the individualistic approach undertaken by Gurr, Michael 
Hetcher (1978) introduced the concept of “cultural division of labor,” which attempts to 
explain the emergence of grievances when cultural differences coincide with 
occupational exclusion. One other remarkable contribution to the literature is Horowitz’s 
book Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), which introduced theoretical arguments that 
linked inequality and grievances to conflict through cognitive comparisons among the 
different ethnic groups. By doing so, Horowitz analyzed power struggles that cannot be 
solely reduced to material motivations (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). 
Greed is reflected by the work of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), in which they used a 
comprehensive data set of civil wars. Their findings indicated that a model, which 
focuses on the opportunities for rebellion, performs well, whereas objective indicators of 
grievances—including inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious 
fractionalization—add little explanatory significance. Among the factors that they 
highlighted influencing the opportunity of rebellion are the availability of finances, the 
cost of rebellion, the weakness of the government’s capability and, finally, social 
cohesion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).Indeed, for “for any conflict to achieve its goals, the 
prerequisites are not only to inflict high and sustainable damage but also to prevent the 
military from utilizing its human and physical capital” (Ali, 2007). 
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Snyder and Tilly (1972) also conceptualized conflicts as caused by opportunity-based 
mobilization rather than grievances. From their perspective, since all societies have 
frustrated individuals, it is thus unlikely to establish a connection between collective 
violence and perceived “hardship” (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). Their 
work could be considered the basis of Collier and Hoeffler’s findings.  
Along the same line of thought, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the factors that 
explain civil wars are not the ethnic or religious characteristics of the respective 
countries. They are, in fact, the conditions that favor rebellion; including poverty, slow 
growth, and financially and bureaucratically weak states. These findings prove one set of 
the theoretical explanation to conflict onset, which claim that the cultural differences are 
superficial and instrumentalized in conflicts, and that the fundamental roots of a conflict 
are to be found in economic (or political) factors (Stewart, 2010). However, it has to be 
noted that while advocating that what matters to conflict is economic development and 
political institutions, and after showing that colonial heritage and the ethnic composition 
of a society have almost no effect on political stability, Goldstone et.al (2004) show that 
when ethnic differences are combined with active political discrimination against 
particular groups, political stability declines. 
More recently, the literature has started to empirically substantiate the arguments in favor 
of grievances mechanisms. Scholars have started to assert the major challenges of the 
different methods used to assess horizontal inequalities and grievances.  
The first problem encountered is how to determine the relevant groups within a country, 
since this requires a study of people’s own perceptions of identity and of the linkages 
between politics and group identities. The second problem is related to the lack of 
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consistent and systematic data, which affects the accuracy of conceptualizing the group 
disparities regarding the different elements of horizontal inequalities. For instance, data 
related to socioeconomic inequalities are often very limited because ethno-cultural 
variables are often not included in surveys. Also, gathering data regarding political 
inequalities would require an assessment of the different groups’ distribution in the 
different power branches. The third problem encountered is of a more technical nature, 
and it is concerning how to measure group inequalities in a way that is comparable across 
countries and over time (Langer & Stewart, 2013) 
Stewart (2002)recognizes the challenges of measuring such horizontal inequalities and 
resorts to individual case studies. She conducted an examination of different cases of 
multiethnic societies using censuses and special surveys.  Stewart contextualized the 
measures of concern for each case study. In her analysis, she found that when ethnic 
identities coincide with economic and social inequalities, there is a higher probability that 
the country in question experiences social instability. As this happens, ethnic divisions 
are enforced (Stewart, 2002).  
Most recently, Ostby (2008) has introduced in her studies large sample quantitative 
analysis, in order to find out the linkage between horizontal inequalities and grievances 
on the one hand, and conflict onset on the other. She used national household data across 
36 developing countries in the period from 1986 to 2004 (from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys) to construct measures of social and economic horizontal inequalities. 
Her analysis shows a positive relation between horizontal inequalities and conflict onset 
(Østby, 2008). 
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For a more direct assessment of the impact of horizontal inequalities among groups, 
which are by definition multidimensional and aggregated, Cederman et.al (2011)had to 
incorporate data on the relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive power.  The 
authors obtained spatial estimates of economic performance for EPR groups, by gathering 
data on the distribution of economic activity and group settlement pattern within the 
relevant countries. Their analysis shows a positive relation between economic and 
political inequality and conflict onset (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). 
Ethnic Political, Social and Economic Inequality and Capabilities Deprivation 
Traps 
Adopting an individualistic approach, Sen (1992) asked the important question: equality 
of what? He first argues that principally focusing on economic inequality leads to further 
conceptualization problems. He then argued that since living may be seen as a group of 
operations pertaining to “beings and doings”, it thus follows that social arrangements 
should be defined according to one’s capability to accomplish and sustain the presumably 
valuable status. This should factor in how equality and inequality are conceptualized.  
In her influential article Horizontal Inequalities: Two Types of Trap (2009), Stewart 
criticized the individualistic approach adopted by Sen. She suggests that although the 
space of capabilities is also relevant for the analysis of horizontal inequalities, it might be 
more helpful to have a broader definition of capabilities. She first argues that there are 
certain group capabilities that do not fit easily into the individualistic conceptualization of 
capabilities like, for instance, group’s political power. Suffering from great deprivation in 
terms of political power has extremely negative impacts on the affected groups, most 
notably being unable to break this cycle of interrelated deprivation. Secondly, she argues 
25 
that there is a need to conceptualize the notion of capabilities deprivation in terms of 
inputs, such as access to education, and not only outcomes analysis that focuses on 
functions (Stewart, 2009). 
Stewart then elaborates on the mechanisms of interaction between the different 
dimensions of horizontal inequalities, which result into the persistence of such 
inequalities over time. The first mechanism is capability interaction, by which she means 
the interactions between capabilities, which take place at a certain time, and extend over 
the span of generations, creating “inequality traps”. For instance, parents with low health, 
education and nutrition capabilities tend to have low-income earnings. This, in turn, 
makes it difficult to provide for health, education and nutrition for their children. The 
second mechanism is interactions among capitals, by which she implies that a 
household’s income is determined by its ability to acquire various capital categories and 
the ensuing benefits It has to be noted that both the mechanisms and the type of traps 
enforce and strengthen each other, which again is related to the notion of 
multidimensionality of inequalities among individuals and groups. Other factors, such as 
asymmetries in the different capitals, especially social and cultural, along with systematic 
discrimination and political exclusion, are expected to aggravate the persistence of 
inequalities (Stewart, 2009). 
Social Exclusion 
It is important to pay attention to the concept of social exclusion in the literature, as it is 
closely related to notions of deprivation and inequality traps. Social exclusion could be 
defined as a state experienced by particular groups of people. It is viewed as a dynamic 
and multidimensional process driven by unequal power relations. It is a concept that 
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operates along and interacts across four main dimensions: economic, political, social and 
cultural dimensions. These exclusionary processes create a continuum of 
inclusion/exclusion, characterized by an unjust distribution of resources and unequal 
access to the capabilities and rights (Popay, Escorel, Hernández, Johnston, Jane , & 
Rispel , 2008).  
Hilary Silver (1994) has introduced three different paradigms to conceptualize the 
definition, including the causes and results of social exclusion: solidarity, specialization 
and monopoly (Silver, 1994). In light of the first paradigm, social exclusion is defined as 
the rupture of social bonds, which are primarily cultural and moral. This paradigm places 
emphasis upon the existence of core shared values forming a moral community, around 
which social order is constructed. In specialization—the second paradigm—exclusion 
reflects discrimination, which implies the drawing of group distinctions that denies 
individuals full participation in social interactions (De Haan, 2000). Discrimination in 
that sense is conceptualized as a failure in the system of society, which is composed of 
individuals who have certain rights and obligations. It is a failure in the structure of 
society that is built around a division of labor and an exchange in economic and social 
spheres (ILO, 1995).In the third paradigm, social exclusion is mainly driven by the 
monopolization practiced by the powerful groups against others. (ILO, 1995). In this 
paradigm, inequality overlaps with group distinctions (De Haan, 2000) 
For this research, conceptualizing social exclusion as a sort of discrimination and a 
mechanism of inequality is of important relevance. By this focus on the inter-relational 
processes of exclusion and integration, the social exclusion framework serves to direct 
attention to another fundamental question alongside with Sen’s questions “equality of 
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what?” and that is: "equality amongst whom?" (ILO, 1995). In fact, Sen (2000)welcomes 
the social exclusion framework. He argues that social exclusion may be directly a part of 
capability poverty, in the sense that it is not only an integral part of capability 
deprivation, but also an effective reason of further failure of capabilities. 
Sen’s arguments is better understood when the different manifestations of social 
exclusion are examined, which can be categorized within four dimensions. According the 
UN, the first refers to the possession and ownership of different assets. The second 
examines the course of acquiring and maintaining those assets, through taking part in 
productive economic activities. The third dimension pertains to providing the essential 
social needs, without compromising quality and levels of access. Finally, the fourth 
dimension relates to the political and socio-economic rights, which constitute the base for 
equal citizenship. This dimension if highly constrained by discriminating policies, and 
the institutional framework that governs decision-making (UN, 2009). 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
Study’s Argument and Hypothesis 
The argument in the study is that in multiethnic societies the different dimensions of 
horizontal inequalities across the different ethnic groups, namely political, economic and 
social are interrelated. They are closely linked to the different dimensions of the social 
exclusion approach. This interrelation is clarified by the notion of the vicious cycle of 
deprivation, as explained by Stewart (2010), when arguing that each type of inequality is 
notable in itself, but also has wide reaching impacts affecting other types of inequalities. 
For instance, political power is considered as both an end and a means, since in many 
cases, political exclusion leads to economic and social inequalities, and at the same time, 
poor education leads to poor income and underprivileged social status which undermines 
the opportunities for political participation and power sharing benefits (Stewart, 2010).  
In other words, the opportunities available for a certain ethnic group to enhance the 
group’s capabilities and different capitals, particularly human and social, directly affect 
the group’s political power relations and vice versa.  
This study relies heavily on the conceptualization of Ostby (2003) to horizontal 
inequalities. Throughout the course of this study, the opportunities and capabilities with 
the exclusion framework are conceptualized in terms of group’s access to durable 
economic assets, education, and employment. The group’s power relations are 
conceptualized in terms of political inclusion and access to executive power. The study 
thus argues that political inclusion is a function of durable economic assets, education 
and employment. This conceptualization is also inspired from the different dimensions of 
social exclusion as elaborated in the literature review.  
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The study assumes that access to durable economic assets, education and employment 
increase entitlement and empowerment, as they help to improve group’s relative 
economic and social status, which in turns, increase the likelihood of political inclusion 
The main hypotheses that is tested is as follows 
H1: Reduced economic assets reduces the probability of political inclusion 
H2: Increased access to education increases the probability of political inclusion 
H3: Increasing employment increases the probability of political inclusion 
Data Sources 
The DHS Survey 
Since 1984, the DHS has been able to conduct more than 300 surveys in over 90 
countries. These surveys have served to provide technical assistance to advance global 
understanding of health and population trends in developing countries (DHS Program). 
The main purpose of the DHS surveys is to provide countries with the data needed to 
monitor and evaluate population, health and nutrition programs on a regular basis. In a 
DHS survey, a sample of households is selected throughout the entire country and then 
interviewed using a household questionnaire to collect housing characteristics and to 
identify all household members and their basic characteristics. Samples vary considerably 
in size, ranging from less than 5000 to almost 30000. The surveys are based on clustered 
sampling (Vaessen, Thiam, & Lê, 2005). For each dataset the actual country is divided 
into between 100 and 521 areas, and 25 households are randomly drawn from each area 
(Østby, 2003) 
For this study, we rely only on the household questionnaire since it provides basic 
information on age, sex, survivorship of the parents and schooling and occupation for 
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members of the household. It also provides information on household amenities 
(Vaessen, Thiam, & Lê, 2005). Since the DHS surveys offers information on ethnicity, 
religion and general welfare on individual bases, it is considered as promising for the 
purpose of measuring economic and social horizontal inequalities in terms of 
opportunities and capabilities of each ethnic group. “An obvious advantage with survey 
data is that one can aggregate the variables, allowing for the construction of descriptive 
measures of horizontal inequalities” (Østby, 2003), then combine them with EPR Dataset, 
which is described below. 
The EPR Dataset 
The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups 
and their access to state power in all years from 1946 to 2013 (Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, 
Cederman, Hunziker, & Girardin, 2015). In collecting the data, the researched relied on 
the expert input of ethnic politics to assess formal and informal degrees of political 
participation and exclusion along ethnic lines. An ethnic group is classified as politically 
relevant “if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or 
if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination”. The power-access 
coding is limited to executive power only. “Depending on a given country's power 
constellations, executive power amounts to control over the presidency, the cabinet, and 
senior posts in the administration, including the army”. Three main categories were used 
to differentiate between the different arrangements of access to power. “The first is 
whether those who claimed to represent a group's interest held full control of the 
executive branch with no meaningful participation by members of any other group”. The 
second is “whether they divided power with members of other groups in a power-sharing 
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regime”. The third is “whether they were excluded altogether from decision-making 
authority within the halls of central state power” (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). 
Groups that fall into the two first categories are classified as included, whereas those that 
belong to the last category are excluded. Furthermore, within each of these categories, 
coders were asked to differentiate between further subcategories as follows (Cederman, 
Wimmer, & Min, 2010) 
1- Included groups that rule alone can be either in monopoly or dominant, depending on 
whether the control is total or allows for “token” representation. 
2- Included groups that share power play either a senior or junior role, measured by their 
absolute influence over the cabinet 
3-  Excluded groups are powerless (access to power is blocked), discriminated against 
(exclusion is systematic and targeted), autonomous (granted regional autonomy), or 
separatist (unilaterally secured regional autonomy). 
The Sample 
The units of this study are ethnic groups-years. The study combines data from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset. 
The study includes all countries where a DHS survey was undertaken between 1986 and 
2014, given that the survey included information on the ethnic affinity or religion 
(variables 130 and 131 in the DHS household questionnaire) of the respondents, that 
could be mapped onto the cultural marker of the relevant ethnic groups as identified by 
the EPR dataset. To conduct the mapping, we compared the groups identified by the DHS 
with those identified by the EPR dataset. After the mapping, we ended up with 43 
countries and 253 ethnic groups. The number of observations of ethnic groups- year is 
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reduced from 561 to 466. Although the time interval is not unified in the sample, we use 
time-series analysis and unbalanced panel data. A list of the countries included, along 
with years of examination and the relevant ethnic groups studied, is presented in 
Appendix 1.  
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variable 
Political Inclusion  
Horizontal political inequality is conceptualized in terms of inclusion/exclusion of the 
particular ethnic group from access to executive power.  We use a dichotomous measure 
that captures EPR’s distinction between excluded and included groups as defined above. 
We choose the political inclusion as the dependent variable of interest as we believe that 
it is the one dimension that has the highest potential of reversing the vicious cycle of 
continuous deprivation. In other words, in order to participate in inclusive policymaking 
that mediates the effects of discrimination and exclusion, the ethnic group needs to be 
represented in the executive power. The variable is measured as dichotomous values 
(0,1); 1 indicates political inclusion and 0 political exclusion.  
Independent Variables 
Economic Relative Deprivation 
This variable attempts to measure the level of relative economic deprivation on a scale 
from (0,1), where 1 implies relative deprivation, i.e. the group has the lowest share of 
household assets compared to the other groups, and 0 implies no relative deprivation, i.e. 
the group has the highest relative share of the household assets. It is inversely related to 
the share of household assets of each group. The first step to construct this variable is to 
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obtain the average total share ratio of durable household assets of each group, with 
respect to the other groups within a country. We use the variables v119 to v125, which 
identifies whether the household has electricity, has radio, has television, has refrigerator, 
has bicycle, has motorcycle and has truck, respectively.  For each group, using Excel, we 
count the number of respondents who have answered positively to the questions of 
possession of each of these assets. Then, to obtain the share of the group for each of the 
assets, we divide the number of asset of the particular group, by the total number of this 
asset among the total groups within the country. We then sum these ratios for each of the 
assets and divide them by 7, the number of assets included in the study, to obtain the 
average share of total assets.  
For example, the share of asset i of group k equals to the number of respondents who 
have asset i in group k divided by the total number of respondents who have asset i in 
groups 1,2,k...n where n is the total number of groups within a country.  
ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܵℎܽݎ݁ ܴܽݐ݅݋ ݋݂ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ݇ =  ∑ ஺೔ೖ∑ ஺೔ೕ೙ೕసభெ௜ୀଵ ܯ⁄ ;  
Where M is the number of household assets, j is the index of groups and iis the index of 
household assets.  
Ostby (2004) used the below equation to compute an index of economic horizontal 
inequality (HEI) based on the different household assets in the DHS survey: 
ܪܧܫ = 1 − exp (− อln(෍ ܣ௜ଵ/ܣ௜ଶܯ
ெ
௜ୀଵ
)อ) 
Where M is the number of household assets, and ܣ௜ଵrefers to the share of group 1, the 
largest ethnic group that owns asset i and ܣ௜ଶ refers to the share of group 2. However, 
since we are interested in the group level indicators, and since we want to include all 
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groups identified and not only the largest two ethnic groups, we substitute the ratio 
൭∑
ಲ೔భಲ೔మெெ௜ୀଵ ൱by the total share ratio and obtain an index that reflects the relative share of 
deprivation of each group. As expected, the relation between the average share of total 
assets and the newly computed index at the group level is an inverse relationship as 
depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Relative Economic Deprivation and Average Total Share Ratio 
According to our hypothesis, we expect that the economic deprivation is negatively 
affecting the probability of the political inclusion. As the poor or deprived groups remain 
on political margins, lack the proper tools to exert pressure to be included in the political 
process.  
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Modern Occupation Opportunities 
The first variable of horizontal social opportunities is conceptualized via the partners’ 
(men) occupation as recorded in variable 705. The original values recorded by the 
respondents are as follows:  
In the data set the coding 1 indicates ‘professional, technical, managerial’, 2 indicates 
‘Clerical’, 3: ‘Sales’, 4: ‘Agricultural self-employed’ 5: ‘Agricultural employee’, 6: 
‘Household & domestic’, 7: ‘Services’ 8: ‘Skilled Manual’, 9: ‘Unskilled Manual’ 96: 
‘Other’, 98: ‘Don’t know’. Following Ostby (2003) approach, we have conceptualized 
the different responses into two categories: with modern occupation and without modern 
occupation. The rationale behind such categorizations is twofold. First, the modern 
categories are assumed to be the highest paying occupations, which presumably enable a 
sense of entitlement and empowerment. Second, they are assumed to closer to the urban-
central categorization, which is expected to increase the likelihood of political inclusion, 
as opposed to the rural-peripheral categorization. The first category includes professional, 
technical and managerial, clerical, and skilled manual. The other responses were 
categorized as without modern occupation, while deleting the responses of ‘other’ and 
‘don’t know’. For each group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents for each 
category. In some of the models, as will be shown shortly, each category is used 
separately in absolute numbers, while in others, an aggregated value of group’s men 
share of modern occupation is computed along the same line as the total economic assets 
share. Our hypothesis is as employment opportunities in modern occupations increases 
the probability of the political inclusion increases. The skilled and employed marginal 
groups are likely exerting pressure, teaming up to open the political space. 
36 
Education Opportunities 
The second variable of horizontal social opportunities is operationalized via the education 
of women as recorded in variable 106 in the DHS surveys. There are four categories of 
response for the question of education of women. These categories are: no education, 
primary, secondary and higher, or don’t know. The last response was omitted. For each 
group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents for each category. In some of the 
models, each category of education: primary, secondary and higher, is used separately in 
absolute numbers, however, in others, an aggregated value of group women’s education 
share is computed, in which the three last categories are grouped together and the share of 
each group’s access to education is obtained. 
Our hypothesis is as educational access increases the probability of the political inclusion 
increases. The educated groups are likely to be more equipped for political inclusion. 
Statistical Model: Logistic Regression 
Given that the dependent variable is a dichotomous binary value of 0/1, we use the 
logistic regression to conduct the analysis. The logistic model is as follows: 
௜ܲ = ܧ(ܻ = 1|ܺ௜) =  11 + ݁ି(ఉభାఉమ௑೔) 
For ease of exposition, the equation is written as follows 
௜ܲ = 11 + ݁ି(௓೔) =
݁௓೔
1 + ݁௓೔  ; 
Where ܼ௜ = ߚଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ 
We use STATA 10 software to conduct the analysis. 
The major challenge faced while carrying out the data analysis was the limited number of 
observations. In many cases, there were missing data either in one or more of the 
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household assets responses. In these cases, the relative economic deprivation index was 
not computed as we attempted to unify the equation used in Excel for computations. In 
other instances, the DHS surveys were missing data on educational level of women or 
occupations of men. For STATA to be able to estimate the regression, it requires that a 
value is present for all variables for a case to be included in the equation. This has 
resulted in the reduction of total number of observations from 561 to 364 observations. 
Data Summary 
Table 1: Data Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Included 466         0.6502146    0.4774146         0 1 Relative Economic Deprivation 
483 0.8272313     0. 1931606 0.0200437    0.9996342 
Agriculture Men 512           1764.313     2454.267          0 16467 Clerical Men 512            101.2129     276.3845          0 3239 Skilled Men 512           612.5703     1364.022          0 16739 Professional Men 512          372.6738     1012.974          0 12649 Modern Occupation Men Share 
500    0.182566      0.207374          0 0.983228 
Primary Women 561  1135.07     1937.397          0       14316 Secondary Women 561         718.4973     1947.412          0   26869 Higher Education  Women 
561            107.4545     388.9808          0 6213 
Education Women Share 
561  0.1786466     0.2155936          0   0.9807889 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the development and logical 
flow of modeling and the steps undertaken to reach the final model that tests the 
hypothesis inclusively are included. In the second section, we attempt to carry out a 
robustness check by reducing the number of observations and estimate the most 
important variables.  
In the first models, we test the relationship between relative economic deprivation and the 
modern occupation categories and political inclusion. In some of the models, we add a 
category of agriculture occupation in an attempt to compare between modern and non-
modern occupations. 
In model 1, we examine the effect of relative economic deprivation and modern 
occupations on the probability of inclusion. We use an aggregate term for the modern 
occupation categories and employ the variable of modern occupation men share as 
elaborated in the research design section. Both variables of relative economic deprivation 
and share of modern occupations of men are significant but both have negative signs. For 
a better understanding of the negative sign of modern occupation share of men, we 
disaggregate modern occupations into its different categories in model 2-4 
In Model 2, the relative economic deprivation is significant and has the expected negative 
relationship with political inclusion. As for the professional category of modern 
occupations, it is significant and has the expected positive relationship with political 
inclusion. The last variable included in this model is clerical occupation, which is 
significant but has a negative relationship with political inclusion.  
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Referring to Table 2, in Model 3, we add the agriculture occupation. The three variables 
included in Model 2 behave in the same way. As for the agriculture occupation, it is 
significant and has the expected negative relationship with political inclusion. 
In Model 4, we add the category of the Skilled Manual, which is considered as a modern 
occupation. The variables pertaining to the agriculture and professional occupations loose 
their significance. The variable of relative economic deprivation behaves in the same way 
as Model 1 and 2 and 3. The new variable of skilled occupation is significant and has a 
positive relationship with political inclusion. As for the clerical occupation, it is 
significant but again with a negative sign. We therefore conclude that the negative sign of 
modern occupation variable in Model 1 pertains to the negative effect of the clerical 
position in the different following models. A summary of models 1-4 is shown in Table 2 
Table 2: Summary Models 1-4 
             *p≤0.1;**p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Relative Economic Deprivation 
-75.2865 (-4.87)**** -14.41125 (-2.48)**  
-12.08019 (-2.47)** -18.77388 (-3.24)**** 
Professional Men ------------- 0.0018305 (1.63)* 0.0043822 (2.67)*** 0.0022601 (1.17) Clerical Men ------------- -0.0063972 (-1.96)** -0.0006018 (-2.74)* -0.0118382 (-2.71)*** Skilled Men ------------ -------------- ------- 0.0025498 (1.72)*** Agriculture Men ---------- -------------- -0.006018 (-2.74)*** -0.0002802 (-1.10) Modern Occupation Men Share 
-58.45421 (-4.53)**** -------------- ------- ------- 
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We now start to insert the variables of women education and explore the effect of the 
different educational levels on political inclusion.  
In model 5, we add to model 1 the aggregate variable of education share of women. The 
three variables are significant, both relative economic deprivation and modern occupation 
have a negative relationship with political inclusion, whereas education share has a 
positive relationship, as expected.  
In Model 6, we start to disaggregate the term of education share into the different 
categories, primary, secondary and higher. The variable of primary education is 
significant and has a positive sign as expected. In model 7 we add secondary education of 
women to model 6, but the newly added variable is not of statistic significance. In model 
8, we add the higher education, but again, the newly added variable is not of statistic 
significance. A summary of the models 5-8 is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary of Models 5-8 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Relative Economic Deprivation  
-46.00078 (-2.07)** 
-38.32028 (-2.42)** -39.21505 (-3.09)*** -38.4679 (-2.79)*** 
Modern Occupation Men Share 
-64.11707 (-2.56)*** 
-32.71963 (-2.03** -35.10447 (-2.89)*** -34.49865 (-2.55)** 
Primary Women ------ 0.001509 (2.70)*** 0.0009707 (2.28)** 0.0009723 (1.75)* Secondary Women ------ ------- 0.0002638 (0.55) -0.000351 (-0.39) Higher Women ------ ------- ------ 0.0050473 (0.80) Education Women Share 
45.25881 (1.98)** ------- ------- ------ 
              *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses) 
 
According to model 5, the 
probability of inclusion is depicted in 
marginal effect of a change in units of Relative Economic Deprivation by 0.1 (X
the predicted probability of inclusion (Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the negative effect of modern occupation share on the probability of inclusion, it 
shown in Figure 3. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units 
of the share of men’s modern occupation by 0.1(X
inclusion (Y-axis) 
Figure 2: Predictive Margins Effect of Relative 
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negative effect of relative economic deprivation on the 
Figure 2. This is obtained by examining the 
-axis) 
-axis) on the predicted probability of 
Economic Deprivation on Probability of Inclusion 
-axis) on 
is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The positive effect of education share on the probability of political i
in Figure 4. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units of the 
share of women’s education by 0.1(X
axis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Predictive Margins Effect of Modern Occupation Share on Probability 
Figure 4: Predictive Margins Effect of Education Share on Probability of 
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nclusion
-axis) on the predicted probability of inclusion (Y
of Inclusion 
Inclusion 
 is depicted 
-
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Robustness Check 
In order to carry out a simple robustness check, we first reduce the number of 
observations by 5% and 15% and estimate model 5 in models 5a and 5b respectively. The 
reason for choosing this model for the robustness check is that it is the holistic model that 
serves to test for the different hypotheses of this study. 
Table 4: Robustness Check Model 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses) 
From these two estimates, we conclude that model 5 is a robust model, since none of the 
variables change its sign or looses statistic significance, as shown in Table 4. 
A second robustness check is carried out, in which we substitute the absolute numbers of 
the variables in Models 2-4 and 6-8 by the relative share of each of the ethnic groups to 
the examined variable, in an attempt to account for the group size effect.  
Robustness check of models 2-4 is presented in Table 5, while the robustness check 
results of models 6-8 are presented in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 Model 5a N=339 Model 5b N=306 Relative Economic Deprivation  
-33.87247 (-2.53)*** -28.68785 (-1.92)* 
Modern Occupation Men Share 
-50.38192  (-3.06)*** -66.82941 (-3.98)**** 
Education Women Share 28.6731 (1.99)** 52.79047 (4.45)**** 
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Table 5: Robustness Check Models 2-4 
 
                         *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses) 
 
Table 6: Robustness Check Models 6-8 
 Model 6a Model 7a Model 8a Relative Economic Deprivation  
-21.93903   (-3.32)**** -65.70827  (-4.58)**** 
-68.34525  (-4.63)**** Modern Occupation Men Share 
-30.18818  (-4.44)**** -70.95967 (-4.27)**** 
-66.48496 (-3.99)**** Primary Women Share 
12.88059(3.38)**** 6.291959 (0.90) 3.130824 (0.32) 
Secondary Women Share 
------- 14.72075 (1.54)  
0.2632835 (0.02) 
Higher Women Share 
------- ------ 6.156725 (0.345) 
                 *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses) 
 From these estimates, we conclude that the models 6-8 are more robust than models 2-4.  
Many of these variables loose their statistic significance when computed in relative share 
terms. This could be due to the fact that the newly computed variables of relative share 
are very close to each other that patterns of change are not noticeable.  
 Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Relative Economic Deprivation 
-19.19473  (-2.00)**  
-14.72309 (-1.39) -9.450591 (-0.99) 
Professional Men Share 1.770589 (-0.78) 8.322418 (0.79) 4.628678 (0.55) Clerical Men Share -4.135654 (-0.78) -7.065769 (-1.27) -0.5073303 (-0.10)  Skilled Men Share -------------- ------- -6.889683 (-1.58) Agriculture Men Share -------------- 5.873665 (1.10) -1.02739 (-0.20) 
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Evaluation of Hypothesis  Table 7 shows the summary of the hypothesis support evaluation.  Table 7: Evaluation of Hypothesis 
   
 
 
 
Findings Discussion 
From these different models, we find that deprivation of wealth assets always reduce the 
likelihood of political inclusion. This conclusion has an intuitive appeal since to get 
engaged in the political sphere, and to be influential in it with its liberal representative 
form, this requires strong political organization and broad influence and proliferation, 
which requires substantial material and organizational resources.  
As for modern occupation, as modeled in this study, it reduces the likelihood of political 
inclusion, especially the clerical positions. However, it has to be noted, as reflected by 
model 2 and 3, that the professional and skilled manual occupations are positively related 
to political inclusion. We conclude from these positive relations that these two 
occupational categories matter more for political inclusion, as professional occupations 
could be considered as closely related to business and ruling elites, and skilled manual 
close to workers and labor unions. As for the clerical position, which has a powerful 
 Supported Not Supported Relative Economic Deprivation reduces the probability of political inclusion  
X  
Increased opportunities and capabilities in terms of modern occupation increases the probability of political inclusion 
 X 
Increased opportunities and capabilities in terms of education increases the probability of political inclusion 
X  
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negative effect on the aggregation term of modern occupation, we conclude that those 
who occupy this position do not have the interest or motivation to participate in the 
executive power. Since clerical position is mostly a middle class position, most probably 
they are not willing to sacrifice their stability and pay the costs attributed to political 
inclusion. They can secure their interests with their incomes instead. This demotivation 
could also be related to perceived corruption and low returns of political inclusion.  
The models also reflect a positive relation between education and political inclusion, 
specifically, primary education. This could be attributed to the fact that primary education 
in low and middle income countries has the highest returns on investment, as opposed to 
high income countries, which have higher returns from secondary and tertiary education 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004) 
Generally, we find strong evidence that the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities  
Methodological Limitations  There are certain limitations associated with the methodology adopted throughout this 
research. First, there are some definitional limitations to political inclusion, constrained 
by the EPR dataset. As a result, this research adopts only the formulistic definition of 
state inclusion and disregards inclusion in the general polity beyond the central state. As 
a result, other spheres where political inclusion matters greatly are ignored, such as civil 
society for instance (Dryzek, 1996). 
Second, there are certain limitations associated with the quantitative approach adopted 
and the use of global data, which results into the absence of an in-depth analysis to the 
different patterns, if any, of changes and fluctuations in terms of inclusion/exclusion of 
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the different ethnic groups within the examined countries, or in terms of their access to 
the different opportunities, including the durable assets, education and employment.  
Furthermore, the limitations employed by the use of DHS surveys constraint the 
conclusions reached to developing countries, and limit comparisons between developed 
versus developing countries. 
Finally, due to the limited number of time variant observations, we were unable to use 
lagged-dependent variables.  
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
The main goal of this study has been to investigate the relationship existing between the 
different dimensions of horizontal inequalities, which lead to the social exclusion of 
certain ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies. To test this interrelation, we decided to 
examine the effect of the different capabilities and opportunities, namely access to 
durable assets, education and occupation, on political inclusion and participation in the 
executive power. We carried out the analysis at the group level. From the empirical 
analysis, we were able to show that deprivation of wealth assets always reduce the 
likelihood of political inclusion. In addition, the increased share of education among a 
certain ethnic group increases the probability of its political inclusion. The hypothesis 
claiming that increased opportunities in terms of market entitlements and occupation 
would increase the probability of political inclusion was not supported in the different 
models. However, this relationship is only understood when we disaggregate modern 
occupation into the different types of occupations, showing positive relation between 
some of these occupations and inclusion (professional and skilled manual) while negative 
relation in other positions (clerical). As for non-modern occupations, like agriculture, 
they were negatively associated with political inclusion. These results serve to prove that 
identity matters for inclusion/exclusion along the different dimensions, namely political, 
economic and social, in low and middle-income countries as differential access to the 
different resources create further cleavages between the different ethnic groups.  
Implications for future research 
Despite the fact that this study has developed some simple indicators of horizontal 
inequalities in terms of access to durable assets, opportunities of education and 
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employment, the data was limited in number due to the limited number of countries, 
mostly developed countries, in which the DHS surveys was carried out. Furthermore, it 
was limited by the presence of data on ethnicity and/or religion in the DHS 
questionnaires and the mapping between the groups identified in the DHS and those 
identified in the EPR dataset. Future research should imply the incorporation of other 
surveys to obtain measures on horizontal inequalities, such as the Afrobarometer and the 
World Value Surveys. Having more observations for more countries would help in 
reaching more generalized conclusions.  
In addition, the study has relied on the shares of each group with respect to the different 
dimensions, which is a general simplification to the measurement of horizontal 
inequalities. Future research should imply more refined operationalization of the different 
dimensions of inequalities and the incorporation of the relative group size.  
Moreover, future research should involve the employment of more control variables that 
contribute to the dimensions of horizontal inequalities, including variables pertaining to 
vertical inequalities and GDP and population, etc.… 
Finally, future research should address the issue of reverse causation, i.e., the impact of 
political inclusion/exclusion on the socio-economic opportunities. However, this requires 
the use of more instrumental variables beyond the scope of this study 
Policy Recommendations 
The interrelation between the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities that was 
shown in this study, particularly economic and political inequality, gives insight on the 
need to develop more comprehensive policies with more effective targeting. Corrective 
measures should incorporate actions on all levels, political, economic and social. Such 
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measures could be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. “This is action taken 
towards the allocation of political and/or economic entitlements on the basis of 
membership of specific groups, for the purpose of increasing the specified groups’ share 
of entitlements” (Stewart, 2005) 
On the economic level, there is a need for more government interventions and regulations 
that guarantee fair competition over the scarce resources. More public investment is 
required to reduce the relative level of deprivation between the different ethnic groups 
within a society. Stewart (2002) also proposes group distribution requirements imposed 
on the private sector in the form of shares of different groups in employment; credit 
allocation and so on. On the social level, more attention should be paid to education 
policies. Positive discrimination policies in the form of quotas for each group are possible 
solution. However, it has to be noted that such policies increase the salience of group 
boundaries and it preferable that they are implemented for a short period of time before 
the implementation of a more integrative educational policy that ensure the rights and 
access to education for all members of a society (Stewart, 2010). As for the political 
level, there is a need for more inclusivity. As stated by Stewart (2002), “the 
monopolization of political power by one group or another is often responsible for many 
of the other inequalities, and for violent reactions because this appears the only way to 
change the system”. In ethnically divided societies, there is a strong tendency for political 
parties to represent and argue for particular ethnicities and neglect others. There is 
therefore a need for a constrained democracy, designed to ensure an inclusive system. 
Features of a constrained democracy include among others: strong human rights 
provisions to protect all groups; requirements that members of each group participate in 
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government; job allocations to different groups; decentralization of government so that 
power sharing occurs (Stewart, 2002). 
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Appendix 1 
ID  Country Years Ethnic Groups 1 Albania 2008 Albanian, Greek, Macedoni 2 Armenia 2000 Armenian, Russian 3 Azerbaijan 2006 Arebaij, Lesgin 4 Benin 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 Adja, Bariba, Dendi, Fon, Peulh, Yoa, Yoruba 5 Bangladesh 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2011 Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists 6 Cameroon 1998, 2004, 2011 Bamilike, Beti 7 Central Africa 1994 Ngbaka, Yakoma, Sara 8 Chad 1996, 2004 Arabic, Hadjarai, Sara 
9 Congo 2005 Bakondo, Bateke, Babembe, Balari, Mbosi 10 Egypt 1992, 1995, 2005, 2008, 2014 Muslim, Christian 11 Ethiopia 2000, 2005, 2011 Amharra, Affar, Oromo, Tigray, Somalie, Gumuz, Harrari, Anyiwak 12 Gabon 2000, 2012 Fang, Myene, Mbede-te 13 Gambia 2013 Creole/AkuMarabout, Fula/Tukulur/ Lorobo, Madinka/Jajanka, Wollof 14 Ghana 1998 Ewe, Akan, Molo-Dagbani, Ga-Adangbe, Grussi 15 Guinea 1999, 2005, 2012 Soussou, Malinke, Peulh 16 Kazakestan 1995 Kazakh, Russian, Uigur, German, Uzbek, Tatar 17 Kyrgistan 1997 Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian, Uigur 18 Kenya 1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2009, 2014 Kalenjin, Kamba, Kikuyu, Meru/Embu, Kisii, Luhya, Luo, Mijikenda/Sawahili, Somalie, 19 Liberia 1986, 2013 Gio, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Mandingo, Mano 20 Malawi 2000, 2004, 2010 Chewa, Tumbuka, Tonga, Nkonde, Lomwe, Amanganja/Anyanja, Yao, 21 Mali 1987, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2012 
Peulh 
22 Moldova 2005 Bulgarian, Moldovan, Russian, Gagauzan 23 Mozambique 1997, 2011 Xitson, Chona, Cichopi, Shimakonde, Ciyao 
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24 Namibia 1992, 2000 Oshivamb, Herero, San, Damara, Kavango 25 Nepal 2011 Hill Janajati, Hill Dalit, Newar, Terai Janajati, Muslim, Terai Dalit 26 Niger 1992, 1998, 2006 Djerma, Haoussa, Peulh, Kanouri, Touareg 27 Nigeria 2008, 2010 Tiv, Ijaw, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Yorouba 28 Pakistan 2007 Punjabi, Pushto, Balochi 29 Rwanda 1992 Hutu, Tutsi 30 Senegal 1986, 1992, 1997, 2005, 2010 Wolof, Poular, Serer, Mandinge, Diola 31 Sierra Leone 2008, 2013 Mende, Temne, Limba, Kono, Kriole 32 South Africa 1998 White, Colored, Black/African, Asian/Indian 33 Sri Lanka 1987 Low-Sinhalese, Indian-Tamil, Sri Lankan-Moor, Up-Sinhalese, Sri Lankan-Tamil 34 Togo 1988, 2013 Adja-Ewe, Kabje-Tem, Para-Gourra, 35 Turkey 1993 199 36 Uganda 1995, 2011 Langi, Acholi, Basoga, Baganda, Iteso, Kakwa, Alur, Nubiam, Madi, Lihbara, Karimojong, Banyankole, Banyoro, Banyarwanda 37 Uzbekstan 1996 Uzbek, Karakaplak, Russian, Tadzikh 38 Vietnam 1997, 2002 Tay, Dao, Thai, Chinese, Khmer, Nung, Vietnamese, Muong 39 Zambia 1992, 1996, 2001, 2007, 2013 Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja, Baroste, North-western, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale, Kaonde 40 Bolivia 2003 Quecha, Aymara, Guarani 41 Brazil 1991, 1996 White, Black 42 Guatemala 1987 ladino 43 Hounduras 2011 Garifuna, Lenca, Maya-Chorti, Misquito, Tawaka (sumo), Pech (paya), Nahoa 44 Trinidad 1987 African, Indian 
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